On the question of using robots to colonise other planets and exploit mineral resources, engineering Professor Daniel Wolpert replied, ‘I don’t see a pressing need to colonise other planets unless we can bring [these] resources back to Earth. The vast majority of Earth is currently inaccessible to us. Using robots to gather resources nearer to home would seem to be a better use of our robotic tools.’

Meanwhile, for anthropology Professor Kathleen Richardson, the idea of ‘colonisation’ of other planets seemed morally dubious: ‘I think whether we do something on Earth or on Mars we should always do it in the spirit of a genuine interest in “the Other”, not to impose a particular model, but to meet “the Other”.’

In response to the second question, ‘How soon will machine intelligence outstrip human intelligence?’, Rees mentions robots that are advanced enough to beat humans at chess, but then goes on to say, ‘Robots are still limited in their ability to sense their environment: they can’t yet recognise and move the pieces on a real chessboard as cleverly as a child can. Later this century, however, their more advanced successors may relate to their surroundings, and to people, as adeptly as we do. Moral questions then arise. … Should we feel guilty about exploiting [sophisticated robots]? Should we fret if they are underemployed, frustrated, or bored?’

Wolpert’s response to the question about machine intelligence outstripping human intelligence was this: ‘In a limited sense it already has. Machines can already navigate, remember and search for items with an ability that far outstrips humans. However, there is no machine that can identify visual objects or speech with the
reliability and flexibility of humans…. Expecting a machine close to the creative intelligence of a human within the next 50 years would be highly ambitious.’

Richardson believes that our fear of machines becoming too advanced has more to do with human nature than anything intrinsic to the machines themselves. In her view, it stems from humans’ tendency to personify inanimate objects: we create machines based on representations of ourselves, imagine that machines think and behave as we do, and therefore see them as an autonomous threat. ‘One of the consequences of thinking that the problem lies with machines is that we tend to imagine they are greater and more powerful than they really are and subsequently they become so.’

This led on to the third question, ‘Should we be scared by advances in artificial intelligence?’ To this question, Rees replied, ‘Those who should be worried are the futurologists who believe in the so-called “singularity”.** … And another worry is that we are increasingly dependent on computer networks, and that these could behave like a single “brain” with a mind of its own, and with goals that may be contrary to human welfare. I think we should ensure that robots remain as no more than “idiot savants” lacking the capacity to outwit us, even though they may greatly surpass us in the ability to calculate and process information.’

Wolpert’s response was to say that we have already seen the damaging effects of artificial intelligence in the form of computer viruses. ‘But in this case,’ he says, ‘the real intelligence is the malicious designer. Critically, the benefits of computers outweigh the damage that computer viruses cause. Similarly, while there may be misuses of robotics in the near future, the benefits that they will bring are likely to outweigh these negative aspects.’

Richardson’s response to this question was this: ‘We need to ask why fears of artificial intelligence and robots persist; none have in fact risen up and challenged human supremacy.’ She believes that as robots have never shown themselves to be a threat to humans, it seems unlikely that they ever will. In fact, she went on, ‘Not all fear [robots]; many people welcome machine intelligence.’

In answer to the fourth question, What can science fiction tell us about robotics?’, Rees replied, ‘I sometimes advise students that it’s better to read first-rate science fiction than second-rate science more stimulating, and perhaps no more likely to be wrong.’